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Commentary on the Selection of
Federal Judges
By THoMAs G. WALKER*
This conference on the Selection of Judges in the United
States has shown, among other things, the rich variety of ways
in which one can confront the topic of judicial selection; The
two articles presented by Professors Peter Fish and Burton At-
kins represent very different approaches to expanding our un-
derstanding of the judiciary. As such, the articles reflect the
diversity that traditionally has been associated with research
regarding the selection of judges. Because the articles are dissim-
ilar in methodology and focus, separate consideration is given
to each article rather than attempting to integrate the two into
a single perspective.
The article by Professor Atkins compares the judicial selec-
tion system of the United States with that of England. It ex-
emplifies truly comparative research. Unfortunately, well-executed
studies that offer comparisons among the judicial systems of
different nations are rare. As those employed in the field of
judicial process are well aware, scholars attempted to establish
a comparative research focus in the late 1960s following the
early success of the judicial behavior movement.' However, the
majority of those attempts were unproductive. Often the at-
tempts were replications of a study previously conducted in the
United States and merely applied to another nation. While such
studies have a comparative gloss, in reality they are independent
examinations of judicial phenomena in other countries. The
results generally are disappointing. Consequently, the enthusiasm
for research focusing on judicial systems outside the United
States has waned.
* Professor of Political Science, Emory University.
See, e.g., CoMPARATIvE JUDIcIAL BEHAVIOR (G. Schubert & D. Danelski, eds.
1969).
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Professor Atkins' study is significant because it avoids many
of the problems that plagued earlier efforts. Two characteristics
of his research make the study genuinely comparative as well as
an appropriate guidd for future efforts. First, Professor Atkins
identifies specific characteristics, stages, and processes that can
be examined in any judicial system and compared across nations.
For example, he analyzes the "selectorate" and evaluates the
"permeability" of the British and American systems. Rather
than highlighting the idiosyncrasies of the systems studied, as
previous comparative research projects have done, Professor
Atkins focuses on shared, yet variable properties that may serve
as a basis for comparing and contrasting judicial systems. Sec-
ond, Professor Atkins offers comparative data. Such data allow
a more rigorous and productive examination of the judicial
systems. By evaluating the United States judiciary with syste-
matically gathered data on the English counterpart, the research
provides a mechanism for gaining a better appreciation of the
U.S. judicial system.
Professor Atkins repeatedly demonstrates the relatively closed
nature of the English judiciary system as compared to the Amer-
ican counterpart. The statistics regarding the judges who serve
the British appellate courts reveal the closed nature of the Eng-
lish system. Eighty-seven percent of the English justices attended
elite, fee-paying schools, and ninety-three percent received ad-
vanced education from Oxford or Cambridge universities. Of
the English appellate justices, none had previous careers as pro-
fessors, government officials, or solicitors. Rather, they were
promoted exclusively from lower court positions. None of the
justices were women or members of racial or ethnic minorities.
In short, research reveals that the British appellate bench is quite
homogeneous. The judicial system is a closed one. By contrast,
the United States has of late placed a great deal of emphasis on
diversifying its federal judiciary. The judiciary has been in a
state of transition from a moderately closed system to one with
expanded possibilities for women, minority members, and those
with family and/or educational backgrounds that do not by
tradition qualify for elite pedigree. Statistics based on law school
enrollment patterns indicate that "the proportion of persons with
such characteristics and backgrounds within the pool of potential
judges will continue to increase.
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Research efforts such as those of Professor Atkins aid the
understanding of the exceptional character of the U.S. judiciary.
It has long been recognized that the U.S. judicial system differs
from that of most other nations in terms of the amount of
power wielded by the courts and the extent to which the decisions
of justices affect the political process. Yet, the degree to which
the American judicial system differs in other respects has not
been clearly established. Only systematic, comparative research,
such as that provided by Professor Atkins, can reveal the extent
to which the U.S. judiciary is an exception to the patterns
formed by the judiciaries of other countries.
When Professor Atkins turns his attention to the conse-
quences of systematic differences in judicial selection, he tackles
a much more complex question. In making direct comparisons
between the decisions of British and U.S. courts, Professor
Atkins sails in largely uncharted waters. As students of the
American judiciary know, it is difficult to compare judicial
behavior merely among state supreme courts or among federal
circuit courts. Despite the fact that such comparisons are made
within the same judicial system, differences in a host of variables
that are difficult to control make valid comparisons a tricky
enterprise. The difficulties are even greater when attempting
comparisons of judicial behavior between nations. Professor
Atkins, although fully aware of the relevant problems, undaunt-
edly compares English and American judges on dimensions such
as the extent of concurring and dissenting opinions and the
tendency of judges to favor governmental and other high-status
parties. The finding that both the elitist English judiciary and
the more open American bench have pronounced patterns of
ruling in favor of superior litigants is an intriguing discovery
that deserves increased attention in well-controlled, follow-up
studies. The finding also brings to the surface the larger issue
of the extent to which differences in selection systems translate
into differences in judicial decision-making and the specific kinds
of cases in which this translation occurs.
Professor Atkins' research begs for consideration of the more
fundamental, long-term impact of differences in the judicial
selection systems. The English system employs relatively closed
procedures with a narrow selectorate drawing judges from a
narrow recruitment base. In contrast, the United States has a
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highly permeable system with a broadly based selectorate choos-
ing judges from a rather large recruitment base. These selection
system characteristics correspond closely with the scope of the
judicial function in the respective countries. The decisional range
of the American court system is much broader and more encom-
passing than that of the English judiciary. This difference poses
an important developmental question: Does a broadly based
judicial selection system encourage the judiciary to play a broad-
ened role? Or, does a judiciary which plays a wide-ranging role
in the governmental system require a more diversified set of
judges to decide its cases? Like many questions of political
development, this inquiry poses a classic chicken and egg prob-
lem. Nevertheless, it is an interesting and important inquiry.
Continued work on such problems would provide rich potential
for expanding the understanding of judicial phenomena.
Professor Peter Fish examines judicial selection in a much
different manner. His work falls nicely into the tradition of
fruitful American judicial selection studies that began three dec-
ades ago. Earlier work tended to fall into one of two classifi-
cations. The first category includes case studies of specific judicial
appointments, such as David Danelski's classic work on Pierce
Butler, A Supreme Court Justice is Appointed.2 Such research
efforts examine in rich detail the rise to the bench of a particular
individual. The second category includes studies that examine
the characteristics of judges or the patterns of the recruitment
process over time. Works by John Schmidhauser 3 and Sidney
Ulmer4 are illustrative examples. Professor Fish's work falls
squarely between the two categories. In the main, his paper
focuses on President Herbert Hoover's nomination of Owen J.
Roberts to the Supreme Court in 1930. However, Professor Fish
employs the notion of "spite nominations" to compare histori-
cally the Roberts appointment with similar appointments.
Professor Fish explains that a spite nomination occurs when
the president, immediately following a defeat by the Senate,
2 D. DANELsKI, A SuP Em COURT JUSTICE IS APPOINTED (1964).
3 See, e.g., Schmidhauser, The Supreme Court: A Collective Portrait, 3 MIDWFST
J. POL. SCI. 1 (February 1959).
U lmer, Public Office in the Social Background of Supreme Court Justices, 21
Am. J. EcoN. & Soc. 57 (January 1962).
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sends the name of a second nominee to the Senate with a revenge
factor playing a significant motivating role for the nomination.
Rather than an exclusive focus on selecting the best qualified
person, a secondary consideration, a revenge lust, becomes in-
creasingly relevant. The nomination becomes a question of power
or, in some cases, a matter of wounded pride. The 1987 nomi-
nation of Douglas Ginsburg provides an obvious example. Pres-
ident Ronald Reagan, stung and angered by the Senate's rejection
of nominee Robert Bork, wanted his pound of flesh. Conse-
quently, he nominated Ginsburg, who in many ways represented
a Bork clone, only two decades younger.
Spite nominations characteristically consist of passion and
emotion which encroach on rational decision-making. Conse-
quently, the president risks nominating an individual whose qual-
ifications are less distinguished than those of the first nominee.
President Nixon's replacement of Clement Haynsworth with G.
Harrold Carswell in 1969 and President Reagan's choice of
Ginsburg following the rejection of Bork are examples. Nixon
was resolved to elevate a Southerner to the Court. Reagan de-
manded a hard-line conservative appointee. When the Senate
rejected their choices, both presidents refused to modify their
priorities and consequently engaged in unsuccessful attempts to
force the Senate to accept lesser qualified second nominees.
That presidents succumb to temptations of spite is unfortu-
nate because, although wounded by an earlier defeat, presidents
may actually find themselves in a fairly strong position. Most
likely, the Senate's energy is depleted by the recent confirmation
battle. The senators do not relish a second fight. Rather, they
fear that the electorate may view them as obstructionists, spite-
fully blocking the confirmation of any candidate the president
puts forward. The Senate hopes that the president will learn
from the previous battle and nominate an acceptable candidate.
Most senators want to be able to support the second nominee,
especially if the Senate is controlled by the president's political
party. For example, nominee Carswell, generally perceived as
having only mediocre qualifications and whose public career later
ended with morals charges brought against him, failed to receive
Senate confirmation by only six votes. In making a spite nomi-
nation, the president demands a rematch and sends to the Hill
1988-89]
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the name of an individual who potentially will provoke another
conflict.
Spite nominations are not the norm. Generally, a president
reacts to defeat in a more rational manner. For example, in 1811
when President James Madison nominated Alexander Wolcott
to be an associate justice, he was handed an overwhelming
defeat. Although Madison's party held 83 percent of the senate
seats, Wolcott received favorable votes from only 27 percent of
the senators. Madison did not react in a spiteful fashion. Instead,
he nominated the clearly qualified John Quincy Adams who
later declined the appointment after his nomination was con-
firmed. Again, President Madison acted responsibly by nomi-
nating the equally distinguished Joseph Story. Thus, Madison's
second and third nominations were of improved quality as com-
pared with his initial choice.
What situations tend to produce a spite nomination? The
historical record and the research presented by Professor Fish
indicate three conditions that seem to be commonly associated
with a spite response. First, a spite response generally occurs
when an individual feels that he or she has been wronged. In
the case of a judicial appointment, the president loses a nominee
who he judged to be well qualified and deserving of confirma-
tion. When the Senate brands the president's choice as unac-
ceptable, the chief executive may feel frustrated, angry, and
prone to counter attack. Consequently, the stage is set for a
possible spite nomination. Professor Fish discusses in great detail
three historical examples in which this was the case. In failing
to confirm Judges Parker, Haynsworth, and Bork, the Senate
rejected candidates of substantial ability. Most modern scholars
would agree with President Hoover that John J. Parker generally
was qualified to serve on the Supreme Court. Also, the Senate's
rejection of Clement Haynsworth is regarded by many as a
mistake. For example, the Judicial Conference of the United
States responded to the attacks on Haynsworth's ethical stan-
dards by appointing him as chairman of the organization's ethics
committee. And Congress, in a rare expression, allowed the
Greenville, South Carolina, federal building to be named in
honor of Haynsworth, a long-time appellate court judge. Robert
Bork, too, may be judged more favorably by history than he is
viewed today. It was not a lack of qualifications that kept Bork
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off the Supreme Court. A substantial portion of his opposition
was spawned by the fear that his persuasive intellectual abilities
might be enough to convince others on the Court to embrace
his "original intent" philosophy of constitutional interpretation.
To those who opposed his jurisprudence, Bork's qualifications,
in effect, made his potential appointment especially dangerous.-
Second, spite nominations can occur only when the president
has an opportunity to react in a spiteful fashion. For example,
when President Andrew Johnson's 1866 choice of Henry Stan-
bery was fatally delayed by the Senate, Johnson did not have a
chance to react spitefully. The Senate not only refused to con-
firm Stanbery, but also abolished the judicial seat by passing
legislation that would have reduced the Court's size.6 In addition,
a president's expiring term of office may not allow sufficient
time to propose a second nominee, as was the case with Lyndon
Johnson's nomination of Abe Fortas. Also, spite is a tempting
course only when the president has the opportunity to exact
revenge on the senators who thwarted the president's nominee.
Such revenge is not possible if a president's second nomination
occurs after intervening congressional elections have changed the
membership and party control of the Senate.
Finally, the president must view the defeat of the original
candidate not as the fault of the White House but rather, as the
result of unwarranted and unreasonable opposition by political
enemies. In effect, this means that spite nominations are more
likely to occur when the White House and the Senate are con-
trolled by opposing political parties. Presidents tend not to act
spitefully when rebuffed by members of their own political party.
Presidents are more likely to acknowledge their own mistakes,
as well as give some credence to the opposing position, when
defeat comes at the hands of their political allies. Furthermore,
the president will not behave in a particularly vengeful manner
when dealing with supporters, especially if they are continuing
members of the Senate who may be of assistance in future
political battles. Spiteful behavior under such circumstances can
be viewed only as counter productive. Citing to the Owen J.
'Ackerman, Transformative Appointments, 101 HARv. L. REv. 1167 (1988).
6 See H. ABRAHAM, JUSTICES AND PR SIDENTS (2d ed. 1985).
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Roberts nomination as an example, Professor Fish notes that
such behavior is worth considering only when the defeat is the
result of a party apparatus beset with feuding factions. Yet, even
in such situations presidents generally will temporize their be-
havior if dealing with a Senate controlled by members of their
own political party, as President Hoover did in 1930 reacting to
the John J. Parker defeat. When successful opponents are not
members of the president's political party, the situation is much
different. The president is likely to perceive the defeat of the
first nominee as a politically inspired, unjustified personal af-
front. The temptation to launch a counter attack, even if doomed
to failure, can be irresistible.
Professor Fish's analysis is particularly important given the
indications that the future promises increased possibilities for
spite nominations to enter the judicial selection process. First,
the importance of the Supreme Court has increased dramatically
during the past fifty years, as a greater proportion of the Court's
agenda has been devoted to extremely significant political and
social issues. Consequently, judicial appointment struggles have
become more intense. Simply put, the stakes are greater. Second,
the number of cases decided by a one or two vote margin has
soared, thereby making each Supreme Court appointment cru-
cial, as evidenced by the Bork hearings. Third, the electorate
has been increasingly willing to give control of the White House
and the Senate to different political parties. Fourth, the confir-
mation process has become more public. 7 Early in the nation's
history, an indirectly selected president nominated candidates to
be confirmed by senators who were elected by the state legisla-
tures. Until the last fifty years, confirmation hearings were held
in private. Judicial nominees did not testify. Today all aspects
of the selection process are publicized. Elite politics have become
mass politics. Press coverage is intense. The parade of interest
group representatives making bold and sometimes unfounded
claims is seemingly endless. This fanfare gives rise to the in-
creased probability that senators will play to the crowd, that
attacks on the nominee will become public attacks on the pres-
See Totenberg, The Confirmation Process and the Public: To Know or Not to
Know, 101 HAgv. L. REv. 1213 (1988).
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ident, and that presidents will be goaded into reacting with a
spite nomination. Such reaction is especially likely when com-
bative advisers, such as former Attorney General Edwin Meese,
are advising the president on appropriate ways to respond to
initial defeats.
Spite nominations typically are unproductive. Presidents
would be well advised to avoid them. Fortunately, a combination
of sanity and exhaustion normally sets in following the defeat
of a spite nomination. Presidents tend to nominate more ac-
ceptable candidates, such as Harry Blackmun and Anthony Ken-
nedy, as a third nominee and thus, the situation once again
stabilizes. Yet, in the meantime the entire system is placed under
extreme pressure. Such pressure is not advantageous to the in-
stitutions involved nor in the best interests of the people served
by the judicial system.

